Plan Administrator of Montgome v. Dika-Ward LLC by unknown
2011 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-9-2011 
Plan Administrator of Montgome v. Dika-Ward LLC 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011 
Recommended Citation 
"Plan Administrator of Montgome v. Dika-Ward LLC" (2011). 2011 Decisions. 1548. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/1548 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
                                                                   PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
    
 
Nos. 09-1735/1736 
    
 
In re:  MONTGOMERY WARD, LLC, et al, 
 




           Appellant 
    
 
Nos. 09-1745/1746 
    
 
In re:  MONTGOMERY WARD, LLC, et al, 
 
             Debtors, 
 
 
PLAN ADMINISTRATOR OF MONTGOMERY 
WARD, LLC; PA COMM OF MONTGOMERY 
WARD, LLC, 
 





       
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D. C. Nos. 2-08-cv-00201; 2-08-cv-00202) 
District Judge:  Honorable Joseph J. Farnan 
                    
 
Argued on June 2, 2010 
 
Before:  JORDAN, ROTH and TASHIMA*, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed March 9, 2011) 
 
Theodore J. Tacconelli, Esquire 
Ferry, Joseph & Pearce 
824 Market Street 
P. O. Box 1351 
Wilmington, DE   19899 
 
David K. Welch, Esquire  (Argued) 
Crane, Heyman, Simon, Welch & Clar 
Suite 3705 
135 South LaSalle 
Chicago, IL   60603 
 




                                              
*Honorable A. Wallace Tashima, Senior United States 
Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation. 
3 
 
Daniel B. Butz, Esquire 
Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell 
1201 North Market Street, 18th Floor 
P. O. Box 1347 
Wilmington, DE   19899 
 
Richard S. Kanowitz, Esquire 
Brent I. Weisenberg, Esquire  (Argued) 
Cooley 
1114 Avenue of the Americas, 47th Floor 
New York, NY   10036 
 
   Counsel for Appellee 
 
   
 
O P I N I O N 
   
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
Dika-Ward filed a proof of claim in Montgomery 
Ward=s second bankruptcy proceeding for amounts allegedly 
due under a mortgage and a lease.  The Bankruptcy Court, 
ruling on the parties= motion and cross motion for summary 
judgment, held that (1) Montgomery Ward was not personally 
liable under the mortgage, (2) Montgomery Ward had no 
liability for common area maintenance expenses under the 
lease, and (3) Montgomery Ward=s Plan Administrator was 
precluded from challenging whether the lease was a true 
lease, as this was res judicata from Montgomery Ward=s first 
bankruptcy proceeding.  Both parties appealed this order, and 
the District Court affirmed the judgment of the Bankruptcy 
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Court.  We will affirm the summary judgment order as to the 
claims for the mortgage note and for common area 
maintenance.  However, we will vacate the Bankruptcy 
Court=s order, ruling that res judicata precluded the Plan 
Administrator=s cause of action, and remand this case to the 
District Court for remand to the Bankruptcy Court so that the 
Plan Administrator may challenge the nature of the lease. 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
Prior to its bankruptcy petitions, Montgomery Ward 
operated one of the largest retail merchandising organizations 
in the United States.  Montgomery Ward=s plans in the 1970s 
to develop the Jefferson Square Mall in Joliet, Illinois, and a 
new department store there gave rise to the disputed claims in 
this appeal.  Montgomery Ward, Joliet Mall Associates, and 
Wieboldt Stores entered into a Reciprocal Construction, 
Operation and Easement Agreement (RCOEA) in which the 
parties agreed to develop the mall and share certain expenses, 
including common area maintenance and repair expenses 
(collectively referred to as Common Area Maintenance, or 
CAM, expenses). 
 
Montgomery Ward contracted with Jolward Associates 
Limited Partnership (Jolward) to construct a department store 
(the Department Store) on a parcel of land that Montgomery 
Ward owned at the planned site of the Jefferson Square Mall 
(the Land).  The parties entered into a Ground Lease whereby 
Montgomery Ward leased the Land to Jolward and Jolward 
agreed to construct the Department Store.  Montgomery Ward 
consented to pledge its fee interest in the Land to secure 
financing for the Department Store=s construction, with Ait 
being expressly understood and agreed that Lessor 
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[Montgomery Ward] assumes no personal liability for the 
payment of any principal, interest or premium on the Notes 
by so doing.@   
 
State Farm Life Insurance Co. financed the 
Department Store=s construction, with Jolward executing a 
note (the Note) secured by Jolward=s rights in the Ground 
Lease, the Lease and Sublease Agreement (as described 
below), and the Department Store (the Mortgage).  
Montgomery Ward joined in the execution of the Mortgage to 
grant State Farm a security interest in its rights in and to the 
Land, the Department Store, and the RCOEA.  The Mortgage 
agreement reiterated that Montgomery Ward Aassumes no 
personal liability for the payment of any principal, interest or 
premium, if any, on the Note@; that is, the Mortgage was 
without recourse to Montgomery Ward. 
 
Jolward leased the Department Store and the Land 
back to Montgomery Ward under a Lease and Sublease 
Agreement.  Montgomery Ward received an option to 
purchase the Department Store at the end of the lease, and it 
agreed to indemnify Jolward for any expenses or liabilities 
incurred as a result of Jolward=s interest in the estate. 
 
Over twenty years later, in 1997 and again in 2000, 
Montgomery Ward filed bankruptcy petitions under Chapter 
11 of the Bankruptcy Code.  Creditors filed proofs of claim in 
each of these bankruptcies on account of the Mortgage and 







A.  Ward I 
 
In Montgomery Ward=s first bankruptcy proceeding 
(Ward I), State Farm filed a proof of claim for the outstanding 
balance of the Mortgage.  The Confirmed Plan of 
Reorganization (the Ward I Plan) provided for no 
distributions to State Farm on account of the Mortgage; State 
Farm simply retained its security interest.   
 
The Ward I debtor-in-possession (the Ward I Debtor) 
assumed the Lease and Sublease Agreement, meaning that it 
agreed to continue to be bound by the agreement and to pay 
any past-due amounts to Jolward.  State Farm, as assignee of 
Jolward=s interest in the Lease and Sublease Agreement, filed 
a proof of claim for these past due amounts, including unpaid 
real estate taxes and CAM expenses (the Jolward I Claim).   
 
The Ward I Debtor disputed the amount of the Jolward 
I Claim, including the allegedly unpaid CAM expenses.  The 
parties settled this dispute, with State Farm receiving the full 
amount of its claim and acknowledging that its claim was 




B.  Ward II 
 
Montgomery Ward filed its second Chapter 11 petition 
(Ward II) less than eighteen months after emerging from its 
                                              
1
 Jefferson Square Mall did not file a proof of claim for 
unpaid CAM expenses.  The Ward I Debtor scheduled two 
claims on behalf of the mall (the Jefferson I Claims), which 
the bankruptcy court expunged.   
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first bankruptcy proceeding, this time with the goal of 
winding down operations and liquidating assets.  As part of 
this plan, the Ward II debtor-in-possession (the Ward II 
Debtor) rejected the Lease and Sublease Agreement. 
 
Dika-Ward, an Illinois limited liability company, 
acquired State Farm=s interests in both the Mortgage and the 
Lease and Sublease Agreement and filed two proofs of claim.  
First, it filed a proof of claim for the full amount of the Note 
and argued that, as a consequence of the Ward I bankruptcy, 
Montgomery Ward was personally liable for the full amount 
of that loan.  Dika-Ward contended that the Mortgage, 
although initially nonrecourse, had become recourse in Ward 
I under Section 1111(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. 
 
Second, Dika-Ward filed a proof of claim for lease 
rejection damages from the Lease and Sublease Agreement, 
which included allegedly unpaid CAM expenses (the Jolward 
II Claim).  Dika-Jefferson B an affiliate of Dika-Ward that 
acquired the Jefferson Square Mall B also filed a proof of 
claim for unpaid CAM expenses (the Jefferson II Claim). 
 
The Ward II Debtor entered into a settlement 
agreement with Dika-Jefferson as to the Jefferson II Claim, 
conveying its interest in the Land to Dika-Jefferson in 
satisfaction of the claim (the Ward II Stipulation).  But the 
Ward II Debtor objected to the Jolward II Claim, and the 
Ward II Plan Administrator, who was appointed to represent 
the interests of the Ward II estate, filed a supplemental 
objection.
2
  The supplemental objection asserted that the 
                                              
2
 The Plan Administrator filed this objection together 
with the PA Committee of Montgomery Ward, LLC.  For 
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Lease and Sublease Agreement was actually a structured 
financing, not a true lease.  As such, the Plan Administrator 
argued that Dika-Ward=s only remedy would be against the 
collateral securing that financing.  The Plan Administrator 
contended alternatively that, even if the Lease and Sublease 
Agreement were a true lease, all CAM obligations were 
discharged and released in the Ward II Stipulation. 
 
Dika-Ward responded by arguing that the Ward I Plan 
confirmation precluded the Plan Administrator from 
challenging the Lease and Sublease Agreement on principles 
of res judicata, equitable estoppel, and waiver. 
 
Dika-Ward and the Plan Administrator moved and 
cross-moved for summary judgment.  The Bankruptcy Court 
granted summary judgment for Dika-Ward on the res judicata 
issue, concluding that confirmation of the Ward I Plan barred 
the Plan Administrator from challenging the nature of the 
Lease and Sublease Agreement.  The court held that the 
confirmation order in Ward I was a final adjudication on the 
merits, that the Ward I Debtor could have challenged the 
nature of the Lease and Sublease Agreement in its dispute 
concerning the amount of the Jolward I Claim, and that the 
Ward II Debtor (and Plan Administrator) were successors in 
interest to the Ward I Debtor.  In dictum, the Bankruptcy 
Court noted that, even if res judicata did not apply, equitable 
estoppel and waiver would bar the Plan Administrator from 
challenging the nature of the lease. 
                                                                                                     
simplicity, this opinion will collectively refer to these parties 
as Athe Plan Administrator.@ 
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On the Dika-Ward Mortgage and the CAM expense 
claims, the Bankruptcy Court granted summary judgment for 
the Plan Administrator.  The court held that section 1111(b) 
did not make the Mortgage recourse but merely, during the 
Ward I reorganization, granted the holder of the Mortgage a 
claim as if it were recourse.  In addition, the court concluded 
that Dika-Ward had not established that Montgomery Ward 
was liable for any CAM expenses to Jolward.  The parties 
appealed and cross-appealed this order, and the District Court 
affirmed, adopting the reasoning and analysis of the 
Bankruptcy Court.  Both Dika-Ward and the Plan 




II.  DISCUSSION 
 
A.   Res Judicata 
 
Res judicata bars re-litigation of a claim if Athere has 
been (1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit 
involving (2) the same claim and (3) the same parties or their 
                                              
3
 The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. ' 157(a); the District Court had jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. '' 158(a)(1) and 1334, and we have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. '' 158(d)(1) and 1291. 
 
AWe exercise plenary review over the District Court=s 
appellate review of the Bankruptcy Court=s decision.  We 
review the Bankruptcy Court=s findings for clear error, and 
apply plenary review to its conclusions of law.@  JELD-WEN, 
Inc. v. Van Brunt (In re Grossman=s Inc.), 607 F.3d 114, 119 
(3d Cir. 2010) (en banc).   
10 
 
privies.@  E.E.O.C. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 921 F.2d 489, 493 (3d 
Cir. 1990).  The issue before us is whether the Ward II Plan 
Administrator, as successor in interest to the Ward II Estate, 




The Ward I Debtor was a party to the Ward I Plan 
confirmation proceeding.  Upon confirmation of that plan, the 
Ward I Debtor ceased to exist, and the reorganized 
Montgomery Ward succeeded to the Ward I estate.  As 
Elizabeth Warren has explained, 
 
Three entities are involved in a successful Chapter 11 
plan confirmation:  the pre-bankruptcy debtor, the 
estate, and the post-bankruptcy business.  The debtor 
gives way to the bankruptcy estate at the time of the 
initial filing, the estate gives way to the post-
bankruptcy entity on confirmation of the plan, and the 
post-bankruptcy business survives the confirmation. 
 
A Theory of Absolute Priority, 1991 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 9, 12 
(1992).   The filing of the Ward II bankruptcy resulted in a 
new estate, with the Ward II Debtor as trustee of that estate.  
See In re Jamesway Corp., 202 B.R. 697, 701 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 
                                              
4
 We note that the confirmation order in Ward I was a 
final judgment on the merits, In re Szostek, 886 F.2d 1405, 
1408 (3d Cir.1989), but we do not reach the issue of whether 
the two claims are identical for res judicata purposes because 
the privity issue is dispositive. 
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The Ward II Debtor, as trustee of that new estate, was 
not the same party as the Ward I Debtor.  It was the successor 
in interest to the reorganized Montgomery Ward and the 
Ward I Debtor. 
 
Res judicata may apply to a successor in interest, 
despite the general rule against nonparty preclusion.  Taylor 
v. Sturgell,  553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008).
5
  The Court stated in 
                                              
5
Taylor listed the following five other exceptions to 
the general rule against non-party preclusion:  (1) where the 
nonparty agrees to be bound by a prior judicial determination 
between other parties, (2) where the nonparty was adequately 
represented in the prior litigation by someone with the same 
interests, (3) where the nonparty assumed control of the prior 
litigation, (4) where the nonparty is the proxy or agent of a 
party to the prior litigation, and (5) where a special statutory 
scheme, such as bankruptcy, expressly forecloses subsequent 
litigation.  Id. at 893-96. 
 
None of these exceptions applies here.  The Ward II 
Debtor did not agree to be bound by the Ward I Plan.  The 
Ward II Debtor was not adequately represented by the Ward I 
Debtor, as the Ward I Debtor did not understand itself to be 
acting in a representative capacity.  Id. at 900 (adequate 
representation requires that A(1) the interests of the nonparty 
and her representative are aligned; and (2) either the party 
understood herself to be acting in a representative capacity or 
the original court took care to protect the interests of the 
nonparty@) (citations omitted).  The Ward I Debtor was not 
the agent or proxy of the Ward II Debtor, as the Ward II 
Debtor did not yet exist during Ward I.  The Ward II Debtor 
did not assume control of the Ward I proceeding.  And 
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Taylor that nonparty claim preclusion applies if the nonparty 
had a substantive legal relationship with a party, and a 
successor in interest has such a relationship with its 
predecessor.  Id.  A trustee in bankruptcy, including a debtor-
in-possession, may thus be considered the privy of the 
prebankruptcy debtor for res judicata purposes.
6
  In re 
WorldCom, Inc., 401 B.R. 637, 651 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(Aa trustee is a successor to the property interests of the 
debtor, thereby placing them in privity@); Edelman v. Mullins 
Orchards (In re Silver Mill Frozen Foods, Inc.), 32 B.R. 783, 
785 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1983) (AThe trustee in bankruptcy is 
a successor to the bankrupt=s property and for many purposes 
is deemed in privity with the bankrupt.@). 
                                                                                                     
finally, even though this case involves the bankruptcy 
statutory scheme, the last exception is not applicable here 
because it deals with claims that were discharged in a 
bankruptcy proceeding.  See, e.g.. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 
755, 762 n.2 (1989). 
6
 The Taylor Court acknowledged that the term privity 
was often used to mean Asubstantive legal relationship,@ but 
the Court consciously avoided using the term Aprivity@ 
because it is often broadly used Aas a way to express the 
conclusion that nonparty preclusion is appropriate on any 
ground.@  553 U.S. at 894 n.8. 
 
We use the word Aprivity@ and Aprivy@ in this broader 
sense, Ato say that the relationship between the one who is a 
party on the record and another is close enough to include that 
other within res judicata.@  Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. 
Hamilton, 571 F.3d 299, 311 n.13 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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However, even though a trustee in bankruptcy has a 
substantive legal relationship with the pre-bankruptcy debtor, 
the A[t]rustee is not simply the successor in interest to the 
Debtor:  he represents the interests of all creditors of the 
Debtor=s bankruptcy estate.@  In re WorldCom, 401 B.R. at 
646 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Because the trustee 
also represents the general creditors= interests, the legal 
relationship between the trustee and the pre-bankruptcy 
debtor is incomplete, particularly when the interests of the 
creditors diverge from those of the debtor.  In re Silver Mill, 
32 B.R. at 785. 
 
In In re Silver Mill, Silver Mill filed for bankruptcy 
protection under Chapter 11 and continued to operate the 
business as a debtor-in-possession.  As debtor-in-possession, 
it issued a check to one of its vendors to settle a contract 
dispute.  A trustee in bankruptcy took over the administration 
of the estate and filed an adversary proceeding to recover that 
check as a preferential transfer under 11 U.S.C. ' 547.  The 
bankruptcy court held that the trustee was not precluded from 
bringing this action.  Even though the debtor-in-possession 
could have brought the preference action, its failure to do so 
did not preclude the trustee who, as representative of the 
general unsecured creditors, had different interests than those 
of the debtor-in-possession.  Id. at 786.  The court held that to 
bar the trustee from bringing this action would unjustly 
punish the other unsecured creditors and would disrupt the 
fundamental bankruptcy principle that like creditors should be 
treated alike.  Id. 
 
Here, as with the trustee=s claim in In re Silver Mill, 
the Plan Administrator=s challenge is for the benefit of the 
Ward II Estate and its general unsecured creditors.  The Ward 
14 
 
I Debtor could have brought this cause of action in the Ward I 
proceeding, but it did not do so because it had an incentive 
not to challenge the lease:  it wanted Montgomery Ward to 
continue operating at the Department Store.  Subsequently, in 
Ward II, the Plan Administrator did have an incentive to 
challenge the lease because Montgomery Ward was 
liquidating, and a successful challenge would increase returns 
to the general unsecured creditors.  See In re Cmty. Hosp. of 
Rockland County, 15 B.R. 785, 787 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) 
(A[T]he debtor-in-possession seeks to continue its economic 
life under the aegis of a reorganization, whereas the trustee in 
bankruptcy aims to terminate the estate's existence and 
distribute the property of the estate in accordance with the 
concept of equality of distribution.@) 
 
These misaligned incentives indicate that, when the 
Plan Administrator raised this challenge to the Lease and 
Sublease Agreement, he did not have a substantive legal 
relationship with the Ward I Debtor of the kind contemplated 
in Taylor.  We conclude that, in bringing this challenge on 
behalf of the Ward II general unsecured creditors, the Plan 
Administrator was not the privy of the Ward I Debtor.  Res 
judicata, therefore, does not preclude him from arguing that 
the Lease and Sublease Agreement was in fact a structured 
financing.  Similarly, because the Plan Administrator was not 
in privity with the Ward I Debtor, the Ward I Debtor=s actions 
neither waived the Plan Administrator=s right to raise this 
challenge nor equitably estopped him from doing so. 
 
B.  CAM Expenses 
 
Dika-Ward=s claim for CAM expenses is a component 
of its lease rejection damages claim.  For that reason, this 
15 
 
claim may be recharacterized on remand to the Bankruptcy 
Court.  However, whether the Lease and Sublease Agreement 
is deemed a structured financing or a true lease, Montgomery 
Ward has no CAM liability under the Jolward II Claim. 
 
If on remand the Bankruptcy Court determines that the 
Lease and Sublease Agreement is a structured financing, 
Dika-Ward=s only remedy for an alleged breach of that 
structured financing would be to foreclose on the Department 
Store and the Land.  Dika-Ward has already obtained this 
remedy:  it has foreclosed on the Mortgage, and Dika-
Jefferson acquired Montgomery Ward=s interest in the Land.  
 
If the Bankruptcy Court finds that the Lease and 
Sublease Agreement is a true lease, then Dika-Ward=s claim 
for CAM expenses also fails because, as found by the 
Bankruptcy Court, Dika-Ward has failed to establish that the 
Ward II Debtor is liable for any CAM expenses.  Dika-Ward 
alleged that Montgomery Ward owes $3.2 million in CAM 
expenses and that, A[t]o the extent Jolward is found to be 
liable for any such amount, it possesses a claim against the 
Debtor.@  Dika-Ward has never alleged or introduced any 
evidence that Jolward has been found liable for any CAM 
expenses, and in any event the Ward II Stipulation released 
Montgomery Ward=s CAM liabilities. 
 
C.  Mortgage Claim 
 
The last issue is whether the Mortgage became 
recourse in Ward I under section 1111(b) of the Bankruptcy 
Code.
7
  Generally, this statute provides that if a debtor elects 
                                              
7
  A claim secured by a lien on property of 
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to continue using encumbered property in its reorganization, 
the bankruptcy court will grant the nonrecourse creditor, 
whose claim is secured by an interest in that property, an 
allowed claim under section 502 as if its security interest had 
recourse.  The key language in this statute concerns the 
allowance of claims under section 502:  Section 502 
determines if a creditor can assert a claim against the debtor 
and in what amount; creditors receive a distribution from the 
bankruptcy estate based on their allowed claim.  11 U.S.C. ' 
507. 
 
                                                                                                     
the estate shall be allowed or disallowed 
under section 502 of this title the same as 
if the holder of such claim had recourse 
against the debtor on account of such 
claim, whether or not such holder has 
such recourse, unless-- 
(i) the class of which such claim 
is a part elects, by at least 
two-thirds in amount and more 
than half in number of allowed 
claims of such class, application 
of paragraph (2) of this 
subsection; or  
(ii) such holder does not have 
such recourse and such property is 
sold under section 363 of this title 
or is to be sold under the plan. 
 
11 U.S.C. § 1111(b)(1)(A). 
17 
 
Mechanically, section 1111(b) affects the distribution 
to creditors by granting nonrecourse creditors an allowed 
claim against the debtor that they would not normally receive 
under section 502(b)(1).  In general, section 502(b)(1) allows 
a creditor=s claim to the extent that it would be enforceable 
against the debtor and the debtor=s property.  A claim secured 
by a nonrecourse security interest is, by definition, 
enforceable only against the debtor=s property.  A claim 
secured by a recourse security interest is enforceable against 
both the collateral and, to the extent the claim exceeds the 
value of the collateral, against the debtor.  If the recourse 
creditor=s claim exceeds the value of the collateral B that is, if 
the recourse creditor is undersecured B section 506(a) 
bifurcates the claim into a secured claim for the value of the 
collateral and an unsecured claim for the deficiency.  By 
treating nonrecourse creditors as if they had recourse, section 
1111(b)(1)(A) gives undersecured nonrecourse creditors the 
unsecured deficiency claim they otherwise would not receive.  
680 Fifth Ave. Assoc. v. Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co. (In re 680 
Fifth Ave. Assoc.), 29 F.3d 95, 97 (2d Cir. 1994); Kenneth N. 
Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down 
Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 Am. Bankr. L.J. 133, 
161 (1979). 
 
This unsecured deficiency claim enables the 
undersecured nonrecourse creditor to vote on the debtor=s 
plan of reorganization.  Absent the unsecured deficiency 
claim, the undersecured nonrecourse creditor would not be 
able to vote so long as it received the collateral=s appraised 
value.  11 U.S.C. ' 1124(1) (a claim is unimpaired if the plan 
Aleaves unaltered the legal, equitable, and contractual rights to 
which such claim or interest entitled the holder of such claim 
or interest@); 11 U.S.C. ' 1126(f) (holders of unimpaired 
18 
 
claims are Aconclusively presumed to have accepted the 
plan@); see Michael J. Kaplan, Nonrecourse Undersecured 
Creditors Under New Chapter 11 B the Section 1111(b) 
Election: Already a Need for Change, 53 Am. Bankr. L.J. 
269, 270-71 (1979).  Without a vote, the nonrecourse 
undersecured creditor would not be able to challenge the 
appraisal process.  Such a creditor would have lost its 
contractual state law right to bid on the collateral at a 
foreclosure sale or renegotiate the loan to allow the debtor to 
retain the collateral. 
 
Practically, section 1111(b) provides the undersecured 
nonrecourse creditor with Athe benefit it would otherwise 
obtain from its nonrecourse loan bargain.@  In re 680 Fifth 
Ave. Assoc., 29 F.3d at 97; see also Tampa Bay Assoc., Ltd. v. 
DRW Worthington, Ltd. (In re Tampa Bay Assoc., Ltd), 864 
F.2d 47, 50 (5th Cir. 1989).  If the debtor elects to sell the 
collateral in the Chapter 11 proceeding, the creditor can bid 
on it.  If the debtor elects to continue using the collateral, 
section 1111(b) ensures that the creditor has the ability to 
vote on the debtor=s plan.  
 
Section 1111(b)=s language and purpose indicate that 
the recourse transformation is for distribution purposes only.  
It does not change the nature or terms of a creditor=s security 
interest.  In re DRW Property Co., 57 B.R. 987, 992 (Bankr. 
N.D. Tex. 1986) (AThe transformation of non-recourse claims 
into recourse claims is for distribution purposes only in a 
Chapter 11 reorganization case where the debtor has been 
given the power to retain encumbered property (over the 




Dika-Ward=s argument overlooks the mechanics of the 
claims allowance process and, if accepted, would have the 
practical result of placing the nonrecourse creditor in a better 
position than it would have been outside of bankruptcy, a 
result not contemplated by Section 1111(b).  In re DRW, 57 
B.R. at 992 (A>It was obviously not intended by according 
recourse . . . to nonrecourse claims [under section 1111(b)] 
that the holders of these claims would be given any additional 
rights under state law.=@) (quoting 3 Norton Bankr. L & Prac. 
' 57.02).  Because we conclude that section 1111(b)=s 
transformation is for distribution purposes only, we conclude 
that, following Ward I, the Mortgage remained nonrecourse.  
Dika-Ward, as holder of that nonrecourse Mortgage, can look 
only to the property secured by the Mortgage. 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 We conclude that the Plan Administrator was not a 
privy of the Ward I Debtor for purposes of challenging the 
Lease and Sublease Agreement, and therefore the Plan 
Administrator is not barred by res judicata, equitable 
estoppel, or waiver from challenging whether that agreement 
was in fact a structured financing.  Moreover, regardless of 
whether the Lease and Sublease Agreement is a true lease, 
Dika-Ward has no claim for any unpaid CAM expenses.  
Finally, Dika-Ward has no claim against the Ward II Debtor 
on account of the Mortgage, as that security interest remained 
nonrecourse as to Montgomery Ward.  Accordingly, we will 
affirm the Bankruptcy Court=s order granting summary 
judgment for the Plan Administrator, but we will vacate the 
Bankruptcy Court=s order granting summary judgment for 
Dika-Ward and remand this case to the District Court for 
remand to the Bankruptcy Court so that the Plan 
20 
 
Administrator may raise its challenge to the Lease and 
Sublease Agreement. 
 
